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Abstract. The essay seeks to make contributions to the clarification of the conceptual relation 
between law and politics. It characterizes law as an institutionalized and normative social practice 
that makes authority claims on its participants. On this basis, legal institutions are defined as 
institutions that systematically seek to influence human conduct by providing authoritatively 
binding practical reasons. The essay claims that the elucidation of the conceptual features of 
legal institutions touches upon a series of issues of justification that belong to the realm of 
political philosophy. This makes concepts like political institution and political obligation 
relevant for conceptual legal theory. After an analysis of the concept of political institution, the 
essay claims that the concept of legal institution and the concept of political institution have 
the same applications. This conclusion is used in support of the main thesis of essay: legal 
institutions are to be treated as political institutions in conceptual legal theory. The essay also 
examines whether the conceptual framework outlined here can be compatible with a viable 
notion of political communities. The essay makes an attempt to clarify the relevance of the 
main thesis in respect to legal reasoning; it insists that the position taken here is unlikely to 
lead to some radical reorientation of legal reasoning. 
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There have been several attempts in legal theory to clarify the conceptual relation 
of law to politics. The present paper is a part of one of those attempts. I do not 
undertake to present here my standpoint on this conceptual relationship in 
its entirety. I have done that elsewhere.1 This paper will have a distinctive 
emphasis: it concentrates on the conceptual characteristics of legal institutions. 
It is only one part of a full analysis of the conceptual relation of law to politics, 
but certainly a crucial part of it. 
  
 * Research fellow, Institute for Legal Studies, H-1014, Budapest, Országház u. 30., 
Hungary 
E-mail: mbodig@mailbox.hu 
 1 See Bódig, M.: A jog és a politika közötti fogalmi kapcsolat: Egy tisztázási kísérlet. 
(The Conceptual Relation of Law to Politics: An Attempt of Clarification). Állam- és Jog-
tudomány, 2004. 51–86. See also Bódig, M.: Jogelmélet és gyakorlati filozófia: Jogelméleti 
módszertani vizsgálódások (Jurisprudence and Practical Philosophy: Jurisprudential 
Methodological Investigations). Miskolc, 2004, 525–553. 
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 First, I shall outline my views on the basic conceptual characteristics of law. 
Then I compare it to an analysis of the conceptual nature of the “political”. This 
will serve to establish my main thesis that legal institutions are to be treated as 
political institutions in conceptual legal theory. Later, I deal with some possible 
objections to my position. In the closing section of my paper, I consider some 
implications of my thesis in respect to legal reasoning. 
 My thesis is neither new nor radical, and I have no wish to present it as 
a revolutionary discovery. Several authors have put forward similar views 
concerning the nature of legal institutions,2 and several authors have encouraged 
us to connect legal theory to political philosophy in some similar way.3 Never-
theless, I think there is room for further improvement in this region of 
conceptual legal theory. It is also important that, as far as I can see, the position 
I take deviates from any similar position. I hope I can make some contributions 
to the clarification of the complicated conceptual relationship between law and 
politics.  
 
 
Some Conceptual Characteristics of Law 
 
To put ourselves into perspective, we need a good grasp of the basic conceptual 
characteristics of law. In the following paragraphs I put forward some claims 
that concern these characteristics. The claims I make summarize the results of an 
interpretive analysis that I have carried out elsewhere in detail, and that I will 
not repeat here.4 This time around, I use these claims to outline my starting 
point. 
 Law consists of purposive human activities that are connected to one another 
in several ways and that are subjects of specialized communication among the 
affected agents. This basic feature can be summarized by saying that law is a 
social practice. Law as a social practice serves various individual and communal 
goals, so it cannot be characterized adequately in terms of its objectives, points 
or functions.5 The basic conceptual character of law lies in its distinctive way of 
serving any function. Law treats human beings as rational agents who are capable 
  
 2 Joseph Raz took it as one of Hart’s main achievements that he depicted law as a kind 
of political institution. See Raz, J.: Ethics in the Public Domain. Oxford, 1994, 204. Cf. 
Bódig: Jogelmélet és gyakorlati filozófia. op. cit. 540–551.  
 3 See Lloyd L. Weinreb: Natural Law and Justice. Cambridge, Mass., 1987, vii. 
 4 See Bódig: Jogelmélet és gyakorlati filozófia. op. cit. 509–535. 
 5 See Coleman, J.: The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to 
Legal Theory. Oxford, 2001. 184. 
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of acting on reasons. Law is one of the social practices that influence human 
conduct by way of providing (practical) reasons to the participants of the practice. 
It is its reason-giving character that makes law a normative social practice. 
“Legal” reasons addressed to the participants of the practice are not simply 
given: they are systematically provided. It is a further characteristic feature of 
the legal practice that certain individuals and groups (bodies) have the task of 
systematically providing reasons to other participants. I call these individuals 
and bodies “legal institutions”. This feature makes law a characteristically 
institutionalized normative social practice. 
 If law is only one of the social practices that influence human conduct by 
way of providing practical reasons there must be something distinctively “legal” 
in the reasons provided by legal institutions. Or, more exactly, if law is to be 
taken as having practical relevance some reasons must owe their distinctive 
practical force to their “legal” character. Law seeks to make some practical 
difference in respect to participant behaviour. And law can be treated as a 
separate social practice if the practical difference it makes cannot be attained in 
any other way. This is one of the considerations that are summed up in the so 
called “practical difference thesis” put forward by several contemporary legal 
positivists.6  
 It is now a commonplace that legal reasons are typically authoritative 
reasons. Law seeks to make a practical difference by way of providing 
authoritative reasons.7 This is what we normally mean by saying that law claims 
authority over its addressees.8 However, pointing to the way the legal practice is 
based on authority relations is only one step towards clarifying the distinctiveness 
of law. Authority relations are pervasive features of social life. Law must be 
differentiated from the non-legal forms of authority like the parental authority 
over the children, the teacher’s authority over the students, the referee’s 
authority over the football players, etc. The key to drawing the relevant 
distinction can be found if we concentrate on the way law is related to the public 
life of communities. As opposed to many other alleged authorities, law claims 
  
 6 See ibid. 69. See also Shapiro, S. J.: The Difference That Rules Make. In: Analyzing 
Law: New Essays in Legal Theory (Ed.: Brian Bix), Oxford, 1998. 
 7 Recently, several authors challenged the standard view that law’s normative claims 
are to be characterized in terms of authoritative reasons. See Soper, Ph.: The Ethics of 
Deference: Learning from Law’s Morals. Cambridge, 2002. p. xiv.  I reject those views for 
reasons not to be explicated here. See, however, my Jogelmélet és gyakorlati filozófia... op. 
cit. 189–193. 
 8 See Raz: Ethics in the Public Domain. op. cit. 215. 
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public authority. And, as a public authority, law claims superiority over rival 
authorities in cases of collision.9  
 Let me dwell a little more on the issue of authority. I chose to characterize 
law in terms of the (authoritative) reasons it seeks to provide, and I find it 
particularly instructive if we reveal some features of those reasons. Of course, 
authoritative reasons have several essential features. However, one can point to 
two particularly important ones: these reasons are both pre-emptive and content-
independent. We might call a reason pre-emptive if it plays a distinctive role in 
practical deliberation: it “is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when 
assessing what to do, but should replace some of them”.10 The practical reasons 
generated by legal provisions are not to “beat” rival reasons in a deliberative 
process that takes all of them into consideration. Legal reasons claim to render 
most of the potentially rival reasons ineffective and irrelevant in respect to the 
practical situation they address. If they provide a clear determination of what to 
do in themselves, no other reasons should play any role in the process of 
deliberation. In respect to law, the functioning of pre-emptive reasons can be 
characterized quite effectively by pointing to an age-old legal principle: contra 
legem non est argumentum.  
 I take a reason to be content-independent if it is “intended to function as 
a reason independently of the nature and the character of the actions to be 
done”.11 This is implied in the widely accepted claim that statutes and judicial 
decisions are to be followed not because they always provide good guidance to 
human actions but because they are the decisions of the proper legal authority. 
The practical force of reasons is dependent upon their sources rather than their 
content.  
 For me, these two characteristic features of authoritative reasons have an 
obvious implication: the addressee who has an authoritative reason to act upon 
can be said to be bound to act in a certain way. In other words, the notion of 
authority conjures up a correlative notion: obligation. I do not claim that 
obligations are always generated within the framework of some authority 
relation. That would be a pretty silly claim. Promises and contracts are obvious 
sources of obligations, and they presuppose no authority relation between the 
affected parties. Nevertheless, authority relations are also sources of obligations. 
One of the implications of exercising authority over a person is that the one 
exercising authority can obligate the addressee by her unilateral acts. There is no 
  
 9 See Raz, J.: Practical Reason and Norms. Princeton, N. J., 1990. 149–154. 
 10 Raz: Ethics in the Public Domain. op. cit. 214. 
 11 Hart, H. L. A.: Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory. Oxford, 
1982. 254. 
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need for the endorsement of either the addressee or any other agent. As my 
readers will see, the notion of legal obligation will have a central position in my 
analysis. In insist that one can hardly have any grasp of the nature of law with-
out understanding that law provides reasons to its addressees that are meant to 
be obligating (authoritatively binding).  
 One could carry on listing and elucidating conceptual features of law but this 
will be enough for my present purposes. The summary I have provided concerns 
several conceptual features of law. In the present analysis, however, we have a 
special emphasis: we concentrate on legal institutions. So we can formulate the 
claim that is of central significance for us now as follows: when we are talking 
about legal institutions we are referring to institutions that systematically seek to 
influence human conduct by providing practical reasons that authoritatively bind 
the affected parties.  
 
 
Why Should the Concept of Political Institution Figure in our Analysis? 
 
The thesis I am defending here states that legal institutions are to be taken as 
political institutions. One can quite rightly ask why we need this thesis. What 
would it add to the conceptual characteristics that I have listed above and that 
made no reference to political institutions?  
 The basic point I have emphasized above concerns the bindingness of 
law. Legal institutions claim that they can provide practical reasons that are 
authoritatively binding on the addressees. However, this normative claim is 
problematic. It is so problematic that one can doubt whether it can ever be made 
intelligibly. It is far from self-evident that one can provide authoritatively 
binding reasons to other persons. First, seeking to influence other people’s 
behaviour this way is an intervention that is always in conflict with their 
autonomy.12 So the very concept of authoritative reason might require us to 
show that there are situations in which such reasons can be provided in some 
justifiable way. I take this as an intelligibility condition. And, even if we 
successfully formulate an overall justification of authority, we will still need to 
find the way it can be applied to the case of law. One can quite easily admit that 
there are cases in which the normative claim we are talking about is absurd 
rather than simply problematic. It would be absurd if an Argentinean in Buenos 
Aires claimed that he can provide reasons that are authoritatively binding on me. 
  
 12 This is the point around which philosophical anarchism typically centres. See Wolff, 
R. P.: In Defense of Anarchism. Berkeley, Cal., 1998. Cf. Simmons, J. A.: Philosophical 
Anarchism. In: Simmons: Justification and Legitimacy. Cambridge, 2001. 
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For me, the upshot of these considerations is that the normative claim of law we 
are talking about would be absurd without the possibility of pointing to some 
“normative state of affairs”13 that provides the framework within which one can 
provide binding legal reasons to certain addressees.  
 So if we wish to argue that law’s normative claims make sense (that they are 
intelligible in the sense of being potentially justifiable), we have to show that the 
functioning of legal institutions takes place within the framework of some 
normatively relevant relationship between legal institutions and their addresses. 
The normative claims that legal institutions typically make cannot be taken as 
(at least potentially) justifiable outside that framework, and one can hardly 
regard a normative claim intelligible (i.e. not absurd) if it cannot be taken as 
reasonably justifiable.  
 The conceptual structure that I have outlined above would collapse without 
finding some solution to this problem of potential justifiability, and I am convinced 
that there is only one way we can do it: by invoking considerations that belong 
to the realm of political philosophy. Ultimately, the issue of the practical force 
of law is to be clarified by political philosophy.14 This conviction can be based 
on several theoretical sources but there is one particular consideration that 
has a prominent role for me. As far as I can see, the problem of intelligibility I 
referred to above is very much like the issue of political obligation in political 
philosophy.15  
 The issue of political obligation concerns certain institutional practices 
(political practices) that claim to provide binding reasons. Those reasons can be 
treated as binding if the addressees can be said to have an obligation to obey 
the reasons provided by the institutions in question. The analogy between the 
conceptual problem of political obligation and the normative claims of law is so 
strong that it might justify in itself the claim that the conceptual clarification of 
law’s distinctive normativity is connected to one of the central issues of political 
philosophy. Although I do believe that the concept of legal obligation is 
conceptually connected to the issue of political obligation and that the authority 
claims inherent in law are claims to political authority, I would not be content 
with relying on this analogy alone. I think the thesis that legal institutions are to 
  
 13 Cf. Dworkin, R.: Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, Mass., 1978. 51. 
 14 Cf. Dworkin, R.: Law’s Empire. London, 1986. 108–113. 
 15 See Bódig: Jogelmélet és gyakorlati filozófia. op. cit. 530–531. See also Győrfi, 
T.: Politikai kötelezettség (Political Obligation). In: Államelmélet: A mérsékelt állam 
eszméje és elemei II. Alapelvek és alapintézmények (The Theory of State: The Idea and the 
Elements of the Moderated State II. Basic Principles and Basic Institutions.) (Ed.: Bódig, 
M. and Győrfi, T.). Miskolc, 2002. 
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be understood as political institutions (institutions claiming political authority) 
can be supported by deeper conceptual considerations. 
 The point I try to make is that the conceptual clarification of both legal and 
political institutions leads us to the problem of authority claims. And if we 
identify the institutions that can be taken as making these claims we will identify 
the same institutions in both cases. 
 
 
Political Institutions 
 
I suppose that there are political institutions and there must be something 
distinctive that makes them political. We often speak of political institutions, 
and, by doing that, we apply criteria that are supposed to identify political 
institutions. There might be something about the discourse on political insti-
tutions that helps us outline a conceptual construction that can be associated 
with political institutions.16 
 Let me start with a sort of a definition of institutions that was already inherent 
in my analysis of the conceptual characteristics of law. I would define institutions 
as frameworks of human interaction that have the function of shaping human 
conduct in certain ways. It might mean to change the conditions (i.e. risks or 
prospective benefits) of human conduct, to provide access to certain goods 
people want to acquire, to change the ways people can have access to what they 
want, to change the ways they perceive what they want, etc. Most institutions 
base their activities on the realization that human beings are rational agents so 
their conduct can be influenced by providing reasons to act in certain ways. 
Most of the institutions can be adequately characterized in terms of the reasons 
they provide to rational agents. 
 If we look for the distinctive features of political institutions that differentiate 
them from any other institution we are likely to find an important clue in the 
popular and professional discourse on politics. We can quite naturally arrive at 
the suggestion that the political character of anything must have a lot to do with 
issues of power. It sounds really promising, as the concept of power is capable 
of accounting for the reason-giving character of political institutions. Power is a 
typical and important source of practical reasons. Powerful people can motivate 
others to cooperate with them by offering to distribute goods that they have and 
that others need. Powerful people can also have an influence on other people by 
  
 16 This is a roundabout way of indicating that I am about to reveal the conceptual 
characteristics of political institutions by an interpretive analysis. On my views on the 
interpretive methodology, see Bódig: Jogelmélet és gyakorlati filozófia. op. cit. 423–506. 
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being able to make credible threats. In these cases, the power of the powerful 
people is a source of various practical reasons for others: power can be used to 
motivate people to act in certain ways and scare them off from certain acts.  
 This way of approaching the conceptual problem of the “political” seems to be 
encouraged by the fact one can hardly imagine any political institution without 
possessing considerable amount of material power. This seems to be a good 
basis of accounting for even the most complex political concepts like “political 
sovereignty”.17 The reasons political institutions provide may prove stronger (and, 
in this sense, “superior”) to any conflicting reasons. These are institutions that 
have enough material power to have a decisive influence on certain people’s 
conduct–they can outweigh any rival institution in this respect.  
 Yet, there are problems with treating political institutions as mere “institutions 
of power”. Not simply because this way of approaching the conceptual issues 
might have difficulties with differentiating between familiar political institutions 
like governments and others that we never call political (like well-organized 
criminal gangs). The basic trouble is that the conceptual account centring around 
power relations could hardly handle one aspect of political institutions. These 
institutions do not simply claim that they are in the position to provide reasons 
of supreme significance: they claim that they have the right to provide those kind 
of supreme reasons.18 By having the right I mean that their claim can be regarded 
as legitimate. Officials of political institutions often do their jobs thinking that 
their activities are supported by justifications that can be reasonably accepted by 
the addressees of their activities: they have a right “to rule”. Of course, I do not 
believe that such a conviction is always characteristic of the officials of political 
institutions. Nor do I believe that this conviction is always reasonably acceptable. 
However, this conviction makes sense in respect to political institutions in a way 
that it never does in respect to some “institutions of power” like large criminal 
gangs. 
 This point must not be confused even if we admit that, in our sublunar circum-
stances, we cannot imagine successful political institutions without enormous 
material power. Of course, political institutions often attain their objectives by 
displaying and exercising their material power. However, we can easily end up 
with a series of misconceptions if we push this line of reasoning too far. Political 
institutions do exercise power but they do it in a remarkable way. They present 
  
 17 For an elucidation of the concept of political sovereignty in terms of power, see 
Benn, S. I.: The Uses of  “Sovereignty”. Political Studies, 1955. 109–122. 
 18 Cf. Strauss, L.: Természetjog és történelem (Natural Right and History). Budapest, 
1999. 136. 
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their power as justified by their right to rule. In other words, they exercise their 
power in the name of their authority.  
 The conceptual consideration to be emphasized here is that a sufficient grasp 
of the political nature of certain institutions will have a normative dimension. 
The claim to legitimacy made by political institutions raises several issues of 
justification that have some conceptual relevance. As a matter of conceptual 
explanation, the political character of certain institutions lies, at least partly, in 
the normative aspects of their functioning. Some institutions are able to make 
very strong claims on human conduct without making any intelligible claim 
to being political institutions. So referring to power relations is not enough 
to single out the conceptual characteristics of political institutions.19 As the 
functioning of political institutions has a lot to do with normative notions (like 
sovereignty), the need to find the conceptual characteristics of political institu-
tions once again conjures up the concept of authority. We cannot have an 
adequate grasp of the nature of political institutions without raising the issue of 
authority. 
 If we encounter again the issue of authority we are also faced with the issue of 
distinguishing political institutions from other institutions that are authoritative in 
other ways. We have already admitted that it might be characteristic of many 
institutions that they seek to provide authoritative reasons. I do believe that 
the distinctiveness of political institutions is to be revealed by reflecting on 
the claim to sovereignty that can be taken as characteristic of such institutions. 
Sovereignty is to be understood here as a kind of “superior authority”.20 What 
distinguishes political institutions from other authoritative institutions is the 
way they are related to rival authority claims. It is quite obvious from the fact that 
there are several kinds of authoritative institutions that there can be and there are 
cases when they make conflicting claims on certain people’s conduct. In these 
cases, some institutions might claim that the authoritative reasons provided by 
  
 19 The same applies to any attempt to define the political in terms of the influence on 
social relations. As an example of this approach, see Győrfi, T.: Az alkotmánybíráskodás 
politikai karaktere (The Political Character of the Constitutional Review). Budapest, 2001. 
11. The influence-based approach is but a more abstract version of the power-based approach. 
It is to be remarked, however, that Győrfi’s other works reflect a view on the concept of 
the “political” more similar to the one taken here. See Győrfi: A politikai kötelezettség. op. 
cit.  65. 
 20 I have provided a conceptual analysis of sovereignty elsewhere. See Bódig, M.: 
Szuverenitás és joguralom (Sovereignty and the Rule of Law). In: Államelmélet… op. cit. 
That analysis, however, had a different emphasis, and did not give this role to the claim 
concerning superior authority. On this occasion, I do not attempt to explain how that 
analysis is related to this one. 
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them are superior to any conflicting authority claims. Or, more exactly, they 
claim that within a designated territory, over a designated group of people and 
in respect to designated forms of conduct they exercise supreme authority. I call 
institutions that make this claim political institutions. 
It is worth making a remark here concerning my terminology. I follow 
Joseph Raz in distinguishing political institutions from political organizations 
(like political parties).21 Political institutions are authoritative–they systematically 
provide reasons that are supposed to be authoritatively binding. Political organi-
zations lack this feature.22 They organize human activities with the purpose 
of influencing authoritative institutions. It can be done in various ways: helping 
their members to become officials in political institutions (through elections), 
putting pressure in political institutions (by way of demonstrations, petitions), 
etc. It clearly implies that political institutions have a sort of conceptual priority 
over political organizations. The activity of political organizations could not be 
described intelligibly without making reference to political institutions. As a 
matter of fact, the whole point of any political activity concerns the existence 
and the functioning of political institutions. It would be odd to call “political” 
any activity that is not related to political institutions–i. e. not directed to taking 
part in the activities of political institutions, or influencing political institutions 
from without, or shaping other people’s views on the political institutions, or 
protecting human beings from the influence of the political institutions, etc. 
 This way of clarifying the conceptual structure of the “political” allows for 
a better understanding of the issues of justification that figure in our analysis. 
Especially the significance of the concept of political obligation. It seems obvious 
that the claim of political institutions to supreme authority is problematic. It is a 
relevant question whether an institution can ever exercise such an authority over 
human beings. It is even more relevant whether certain actual institutions can 
justifiably claim this kind of authority over certain people in actual situations. 
The fact that the normative claims of political institutions are problematic makes 
issues of intelligibility dependent upon the answerability of several issues of 
justification here. And this is where the conceptual significance of the issues of 
political obligation become manifest. 
 
 
  
 21 See Raz, J.: The Morality of Freedom. Oxford, 1986. 4.  
 22 The terminology I use here may seem a bit misleading. Political organizations like 
political parties clearly fall under my definition of institutions. However, they might lack 
the necessary features of political institutions. They are institutions but not political 
institutions.   
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The “Legal” and the “Political” 
 
We have now some conceptual claims on legal institutions and a short analysis 
of the nature of political institutions behind us. It is time to connect them if we 
want to use them in support of the thesis I defend in this paper. Of course, there 
are striking analogies between the two analyses. But what is the significance of 
those analogies? In order to clarify that, we need to concentrate on the real life 
applications of my abstract conceptual constructions. We need to try to identify 
institutions that fit in my analysis, which can be taken to provide practical reasons 
the way I indicated.  
 Unfortunately, this issue of application concerns a series of complicated 
methodological problems, and this is not the proper occasion to explore those 
problems. As I have tried to handle those problems elsewhere,23 I simply put 
forward the conclusion of that analysis here. I hope that my claims will not be 
counter-intuitive. The relevant conclusion has two elements. The first is that the 
characterization of political institutions that I have provided can be applied, 
among others, to courts, legislative assemblies, and administrative agencies. 
The second element is that the way I characterized legal institutions would single 
out very much the same institutions: courts, legislative assemblies, administrative 
agencies. On the level of applications, there is no difference in respect to the 
implications of my two analyses. And the best explanation of this conclusion is 
that legal institutions are political institutions. 
 There are two further questions still to be considered here. The first is about 
the possibility of other plausible explanations of this identity of applications. 
Are we bound to accept that the identity of the applications is enough to estab-
lish my thesis? As far as I can see, there is only one possible alternative to my 
explanation of this identity. One could claim that the issue of application is not 
conclusive here for it is possible that the legal and the political character are two 
different dimensions of the institutions we have singled out. Just like a novel can 
be the source of historical knowledge and artistic experience at the same time, 
the legal and the political character of the same institutions might be analytically 
distinguishable. A version of this position is represented by some advocates of 
system theory.24 They claim that the social system is divided into autopoietic 
subsystems. The “legal” and the “political” mark two of these subsystems. And 
although there are institutions (like legislative assemblies) that play a role in 
both subsystems, they can be clearly differentiated if we concentrate on their 
different functions and their different ways of selecting information.  
  
 23 See Bódig: Jogelmélet és gyakorlati filozófia. op. cit. 509–535. 
 24 See Pokol, B.: A jog szerkezete (The Structure of Law). Budapest, 1991. 65–67. 
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 Can we be forced to accept this approach? I do not think so. If the above 
analyses were not basically mistaken, the legal and the political character cannot 
belong to different conceptual dimensions of the same institutions. We should 
not forget that the characterization of the “legal” and the “political” were related 
to the same aspects of the institutional practice: the distinctive character of 
the reasons they seek to provide. The conceptual characteristics were heavily 
dependent upon the authority claims of the institutions in both cases. 
 The second question to be considered here concerns a possible incongruence 
of my thesis and its justification. My thesis was that legal institutions are 
actually political. However, when I tried to provide arguments to support it I 
claimed that some institutions are both legal and political. My thesis suggests 
that the “political” is conceptually more basic than the “legal”, and my arguments 
did not justify this priority claim. On the basis of my analysis, one could claim 
with equal plausibility that political institutions are necessarily legal in their 
character.  
 Of course, I claim that the “political” must have some conceptual priority if 
we try to clarify the nature of legal institutions. My justification for this claim is 
a consequence of the realization that the conceptual analysis of legal institutions 
will necessarily encounter problems that belong to the realm of political 
philosophy. Referring to the political nature of legal institutions provides the 
key to the solution of several conceptual issues concerning law. I do not think 
that the same can be said of the legal character of political institutions. Referring 
to the legal character of political institutions would not open up an analytic dimen-
sion that would not be revealed otherwise. This methodological consideration is 
the heart of the thesis that I defend in this paper.  
 
 
Vicious Circularity? 
 
There is a further question that is to be handled here and that deserves even more 
attention. I have argued that conceptual legal theory must treat legal institutions 
as political institutions. Someone might object that my justification for this 
claim is straightforwardly implausible. When I provided a basic characterization 
of law, I emphasized that law claims public authority. Although I failed to 
provide even the outlines of an adequate clarification of the meaning of “public” 
here, a careful analysis would reveal that I tacitly assumed that the public life to 
which law is to be taken to belong is something that we normally associate with 
political communities. When I reached the conclusion that legal institutions are 
political institutions it was no more then a mere consequence of this tacit 
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assumption. And, as the underlying point was not justified, I was begging the 
question here in a quite damaging way. I failed to inform my readers on the 
conceptual significance of political communities (that have public lives in the 
relevant sense). I still owe them a useful definition of political communities and 
their public lives.  
 Even more unfortunately for me, my analysis does not seem to have the 
resources for providing such a definition. I relied heavily on the concept of 
political institutions. But we do not have any clear idea of political institutions 
without understanding that they are to be taken as representatives of political 
communities. They would not be political without having a political community 
they could represent. So I am in a lot of trouble if we realize that my analysis 
contained nothing that could allow for a clarification of the concept of political 
communities or, more exactly, the criteria that make certain communities political. 
My analysis is so strongly and thoroughly tied to the conceptual characteristics 
of institutional practice that I would not be able to provide any elucidation of the 
nature of the “political” without making reference to institutions. That would 
force me to describe political communities as communities having political 
institutions: a community would not be political without being dominated by 
political institutions. Then it would be terrible confusion around the claim that 
political institutions represent political communities. It would involve a pretty 
vicious circularity. 
 This is undoubtedly a formidable challenge to my position. But I am confident 
that it can be met. I admit that my way of elucidating the nature of the “political” 
is strongly tied to the issues of institutional practice. I have no wish to deny this. 
What I have got to deny is the dependence of my position on a “pre-institu-
tional” notion of political community. I think there is one point in my reasoning 
that can be used as a starting point here. We can guarantee a sort of conceptual 
priority to the claim that some institutions claim superior authority over rival 
authorities. Then we could point to this as the heart of nature of the “political”. 
And, as we have a chance of clarifying the conceptual character of authority in 
terms of the distinctive reasons they provide, this superiority claim can provide a 
first approximation of the concept of political institutions without begging any 
question.  
 Then, in the next phase, we could point to the problematic nature of such an 
authority claim. It is not self-evident that such an authority claim can ever be 
justified. In order to make it intelligible, we need to show the relevant context 
in which it can be made with any chance of being justified. Such an authority 
claim should be situated in the framework of some distinctive relationship 
among persons. This framework cannot be generated by some “private” relation-
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ship based on direct interpersonal connections (like ordinary contracts or family 
ties). This is where the need for making reference to something like the “public” 
character comes from. Then, we could argue that the practice of an institution 
cannot involve such an authority claim without taking the addressees to 
belong to a community that the institution in question can represent. It must be a 
community that could not be maintained without the contribution of institutions 
that claim superior authority over the members of the community. We might call 
this kind of communities (for which the functioning of political institutions is an 
existence condition) “political”.  
 In this case the clarification of the conceptual nature of communities would 
have two essential elements: the concept of political institution and the con-
siderations concerning the need for such institutions in certain communities. I do 
not think that such a clarification would involve any vicious circularity. In 
this case, we can define political institutions without even mentioning political 
communities. The concept of political community figures in our reasoning when 
we ask what gives rise to the need for political institutions in certain communities. 
In other words, the concept of political institution is given to us as a conceptual 
possibility on the basis of our reflection on the various forms of providing 
practical reasons to rational agents, while the concept of political community 
figures in the analysis when we begin to raise questions concerning the 
applications of such a conceptual possibility. The concept of political community 
has no constitutive role in the basic conceptual characterization of political 
institutions. Political communities become a factor in the conceptual analysis 
when we begin to elucidate the issues of justification concerning political 
institutions.25  
 
 
What about Legal Reasoning? 
 
I would like to make one last point. If the conceptual claim I have made is 
acceptable we need to raise questions concerning its significance. Of course, a 
  
 25 It sounds like separating conceptual issues and issues of justification. Yet, I claim that 
the issue of justification is relevant in respect to singling out the conceptual characteristics of 
political institutions. Is not it a straightforward contradiction? No. Issues of justification play 
two roles here. They have a conceptual significance: in respect to some concepts, we have to 
realize that their elucidation must make reference to issues of justification. But making that 
reference is still a conceptual claim. When we go further and try to answer substantial issues 
of justification we leave the territory of conceptual analysis. So what I was referring to was 
partly based on the difference between determining the conceptual characteristics of issues of 
justification and providing substantial answers to issues of justification. 
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conceptual claim can be significant in several respects. What I am particularly 
interested in is its bearing on issues of legal reasoning. Lawyers normally believe 
that legal reasoning can be clearly differentiated from political deliberation. The 
conceptual claim I have made seems to undermine this way of perceiving legal 
reasoning. 
 One could object that my highly abstract analysis cannot have such far-
reaching consequences in respect to legal reasoning. The way I attributed political 
characteristics to legal institutions was hardly more than a way of emphasizing 
their authoritative nature. And that is something already inherent in the way 
lawyers perceive the task of legal reasoning. Although I warn anyone against 
drawing some hasty conclusions from my standpoint concerning legal reasoning, I 
would hesitate to downplay its practical significance this way. One aspect of my 
analysis suggests possibly far-reaching consequences. I have tried to reveal a 
conceptual connection between legal and political obligation. Everyone knows 
that legal obligations play a central law in legal reasoning. Legal reasoning normally 
concerns issues of personal legal responsibility, and legal responsibility is always 
a matter performing legal obligations. On the other hand, political obligation 
is a matter of justifying obedience. In other words, it has a lot to do with the 
problems of political legitimacy. If legal obligations are conceptually connected 
to some construction of political obligation, legal obligations might become 
heavily dependent upon political legitimacy. And political legitimacy is some-
thing that is notoriously controversial.     
 Of course, I cannot clarify this issue now. I admit that I have a lot to do to 
clarify the implications of my conception concerning the issues of legal reasoning. 
I use this occasion only to deepen our understanding of the way issues of political 
legitimacy concern legal reasoning. I will indicate that it is highly unlikely that I 
could end up with requiring some radical reorientation of legal reasoning. 
 How could issues of political legitimacy have a profound effect on legal 
reasoning? Let me outline one possibility. Political legitimacy presupposes 
justifying reasons that are addressed to every member of the community. And as 
some people can hardly be motivated by moral reasons, such a comprehensive 
justification may be destined to be tied to some very basic forms of self-interest. 
(Like avoiding violent death.) It may be that only those interests can have equal 
justifying force in an existing community. In this case, the basic justification of 
political obligation will centre around prudential reasons originating from self-
interests. And if legal obligations are conceptually connected to the relevant 
construction of political obligation they will be tied to certain prudential reasons 
as well. The whole point of legal institutions will be the service of self-interest. 
And this may deprive legal reasoning of its value-content–of its moral worth. It 
48 MÁTYÁS BÓDIG 
  
provides a basis for deeply amoral practical orientations concerning law that are 
sensitive only to the relevant prudential reasons. Law will have to be depicted as 
a web of strategic interactions. Treating legal institutions as political institutions 
will turn out to be a demoralizing aspiration. In other words, we might end 
up with Holmes’ suggestions that we should see the law from the “bad man’s” 
point of view when we consider issues of legal reasoning.26  
 I am quite sure that some legal theorists would happily accept these 
consequences, but I do not share their views on law. I would hesitate to subscribe 
to a conceptual explanation of law that treats it as a web of strategic interactions 
and that renders legal reasoning a competition of mere prudential reasons. How-
ever, I am convinced that it is not to be taken as a necessary implication of my 
conception. 
 Let me try to elucidate my views on this matter with the help of a highly 
relevant example. Very similar considerations can be put forward when we are 
discussing the justificatory issues of democracy. It might seem unrealistic to 
claim that democratic institutions are to be treated as manifestations of a self-
governing political community consisting of morally committed members. It 
is more realistic and reasonable to claim that the democratic process provides a 
framework for making political decisions that have considerable advantages 
over rival institutional solutions. And the advantages are to be explained 
only in terms of the self-interests of the affected parties. Democracy might be 
acceptable for everyone because it guarantees that his or her interests will have 
an effect on the political process. We may reasonably hope that elected officials 
in a democratic regime will understand that they will not stay in power if they 
frequently and openly ignore the interests of those they seek to govern. (Or, 
more exactly, if they do not even make an attempt to justify their activities in 
terms of the interests of the governed.) The democratic process links the interest 
to stay in power with the perceived interests of the governed.27 Of course, it will 
not guarantee that merely self-interested practices by the officials will be 
impossible or will always be revealed and eradicated. We have got to settle for a 
more modest claim: the democratic process seems to be the most effective of the 
available measures against ignoring the interests of the governed.  
  
 26 See Holmes, O. W.: The Path of the Law. In: The Path of the Law and Its Influence: 
The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Ed.: Burton, S. J.). Cambridge, 2000. 200–
204. 
 27 See Kis, J.: A politika mint erkölcsi probléma (Politics as a Moral Problem). Budapest, 
2004. 66–73. See also Bentham, J.: Plan for Parliamentary Reform. In: Works of Jeremy 
Bentham (Ed.: Bowring, J.), vol. 3, Edinburgh, 1843. 
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 Does this mean that a viable justificatory theory of democracy must be based 
solely on prudential reasons generated by the perceived interests of the officials 
and the governed? I do not think so. When we describe the actual operation of 
democratic institutions and its effect on ordinary people we need a framework that 
is not tied to ideal assumptions concerning human conduct and that does not 
presuppose attitudes and patterns of behaviour that are unlikely to prevail amongst 
members of existing communities. What makes democracy work effectively is to 
be explained largely in terms of the self-interest of the participants. And certain 
issues of justification are to be answered along the lines of this explanation. In this 
case, democracy appears to be a web of strategic interactions. However, it does 
not mean that the issue of justification is exhausted by such an explanation.  
 The fact that democracy as a working institutional framework does not pre-
suppose a community of moral heroes says not much on the moral worth of 
democracy. When we turn to issues of moral worth we need more elevated 
conceptions that go beyond what makes political institutions effective. These 
elevated conceptions reflect several normative (value-related) aspects of the 
democratic process that are also embodied in the operation of democratic insti-
tutions. It becomes pretty obvious when we are faced with the language of the 
democratic discourse. That language is permeated by ideals and ideal assumptions 
that have a significant effect on the outcome of democratic decision-making. If 
we are to account for this fact we need to depict democracy as a system that 
makes use of various forms of self-interested behaviour without losing its deeper 
moral point. And that way of depicting democracy will reveal some moral aspects 
of democratic policy that are highly relevant even if they are ignored by many 
members of the democratic community. Without taking these moral aspects into 
account, we would not be able to elucidate what makes democracy valuable for 
us, what makes democratic institutions worthy of our support.  
 There are aspects of the theoretical and practical problems of democracy that 
may steer us towards a rather mundane view. However, the mundane view of 
democracy often breaks down. So we need to pay attention to other issues as 
well (like the issue of what makes democracy worthy of our respect) that steer 
us towards less mundane views–elevated by substantial practical principles and 
several ideal assumptions.  
 Although it would be too early to claim that I have elucidated the implications 
of these theoretical problems, I suspect that we would reach very similar con-
clusions in respect to legal reasoning. Of course, there are aspects of the legal 
practice that would not be effective without addressing the prudential reasons 
available to the affected parties. It well may be that we will be more sensitive to 
those aspects if we claim that legal obligations are conceptually connected to 
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issues of political legitimacy. But there are other relevant aspects as well that 
cannot be explained in terms of mere prudential reasons. Claiming that issues of 
political legitimacy figure in legal reasoning is unlikely to force us into a sort of 
demoralization of legal reasoning. I am quite sure that this suggestion would 
be reinforced if we considered the most characteristic cases where issues of 
political legitimacy are linked with issues of legal obligation: cases of civil 
disobedience.28 
  
 28 Cf. Bódig, M.: Rendszerváltás, politikai moralitás, legalitás (Political Transition, 
Political Morality, Legality). Fundamentum, 2003, 87–94. 
